Ouster of jurisdiction of the Labour Court upon filing a claim with the Industrial Court (case analysis of the CA Decision of Philip Pang v M Jet)
- Gavin Jayapal
- 12 minutes ago
- 4 min read
Philip Pang & 1 or. v M Jets International is an interesting decision.
Brief facts
PP and GM's employment history and the dispute
In November 2020, Philip Pang (PP) and Gunasekar Mariappan (GM) were appointed as the CFO and MD of M Jets, respectively. They each drew a salary of RM30,000.
In mid-2022, they unilaterally increased this salary to RM50,000 and RM60,000, respectively.
In February 2023, M Jets suspended them both with pay. M Jets failed to pay them their salaries for February and March 2023.
On 16.03.2023, PP and GM lodged a complaint with the Labour Office.
M Jet terminates their employment
On 12.04.2023, M Jet terminated PP and GM.
On 14.04.2023, PP and GM filed for unfair dismissal with the Industrial Court.
At this juncture, there were 2 proceedings afoot:
a. The Labour Office; and
b. The Industrial Court.
The Labour Office decides in favour of PP and GM
In August 2023, the Labour Office determined the complaint in favour of PP and GM. M Jets was ordered to pay a sum of RM264,000.
Dissatisfied, M Jets appealed. The HC allowed the appeal and set-aside the Labour Office's Award.
The CA's decision
Dissatisfied with the HC's decision, PP and GM appealed to the CA. The CA unanimously dismissed the appeal.
Ouster of jurisdiction of the Labour Court upon the filing of a claim with the Industrial Court
The CA determined the core issue at-hand:
[9] The main issue was whether the learned High Court Judge had erred in interpreting section 69A of the Employment Act too broadly to oust the Labour Office's jurisdiction over a pure wage claim, thereby denying the Appellants a statutory remedy for an accrued debt.
After having discussed the various principles governing appellate intervention (paras. 11-15), the CA determined that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to issue its award. This was premised upon S. 69A of the Employment Act 1955:
Whether the learned High Court Judge had erred in the interpretation of section 69A of the Employment Act
[16] The gist of this Appeal was whether the learned High Court Judge was correct in interpreting section 69A of the Employment Act to oust the Labour Office's jurisdiction over a pure wage claim, thereby denying the Appellants a statutory remedy for an accrued debt. Section 69A of the Employment Act reads:
Section 69A – Limitation on power conferred by section 69 Notwithstanding section 69, the Director General shall not inquire into, hear, decide or make any order in respect of any claim, dispute or purported dispute which, in accordance with the Industrial Relations Act 1967-
(a) is pending in any inquiry or proceedings under that Act;
(b) has been decided upon by the Minister under subsection 20(3) of that Act; or
(c) has been referred to, or is pending in any proceedings before, the Industrial Court. [Emphasis added.]
[17] Section 69A of the Employment Act acts as a clear jurisdictional bar, stipulating that the Director General shall not intervene in any dispute which is pending before the Industrial Court.
The CA then determined as follows:
[20] The ouster of the Labour Office's jurisdiction serves the critical legislative purpose of preventing a duplicity of proceedings and avoiding the risk of conflicting decisions. Allowing parallel adjudication in the Labour Office and the Industrial Court on factually overlapping issues would undermine the coherence and finality of the dispute resolution process. On this point, we found instructive the case of Uvarajah Kanasevan & Anor v Penolong Pengarah Buruh, Butterworth & Ors [1992] 1 CLJ Rep.
The CA observed that the learned HCJ had gone a little bit too far by enquiring into the merits. However, the decision was ultimately correct (paras. 21-22).
Conclusion
A tidy Judgment that deals with a thorny issue. Hindsight (which is always 20/20) would indicate that PP and GM should have exhausted the Labour Court first and then filed their claim for unfair dismissal.
However, they would have been in a Catch-22 as the 60-day time period to lodge a claim with the Industrial Court would have begun to run from 12.04.2023.
Damned if you do, damned if you don't.
GAVIN JAYAPAL
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